The Russian Federation has been waging a multi-faceted hybrid influence campaign against the Baltic states for many years.
Moscow relies on various instruments of “soft power”: from economic presence to cultural and sporting projects. The Kremlin actively exploits the ideology of the “Russian world” and the narrative of “protecting compatriots abroad” to justify interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries.
The information front plays a particularly important role in this hybrid strategy. Social networks have become a space of accelerated “militarization,” where limited regulation and open borders enable the uncontrolled spread of disinformation and hate. This is facilitated by networks of fake accounts and so-called troll factories. One of the most notorious examples is the “Olgino bot farm” in St. Petersburg (the Internet Research Agency previously supported by the late Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin).
Such organizations have been spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation for years and trying to influence audiences online – including in the Baltic states. Beyond the media sphere, the Kremlin uses economic levers and sport as additional instruments of influence. Investments and business relationships are often used to put pressure on elites or to circumvent sanctions. Sport, in turn, has become a battlefield of soft power: not only through the purchase of foreign sports clubs by Russian oligarchs, but also through individuals whose activities, experts say, reflect Moscow’s interests. In recent years, similar trends have been observed in the Lithuanian business environment.
A shadow figure in sports propaganda?
Recently, Lithuanian business tycoon Gediminas Žemelis – often referred to as the richest man in Lithuania – came under public criticism again. He controls Avia Solutions Group (ASG), an aviation holding company with more than 100 companies in 68 countries. However, his activities were not without controversy.
Lithuanian authorities have previously suspended several of Žemelis’ projects over concerns about possible links to Russian companies, including security services. At a hearing in the European Parliament in May 2021, Russian opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky specifically referred to “possible connections” between the Avia Solutions Group and people from Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.
More recently, investigative journalists have focused on the young Lithuanian sports manager Ovidijus Jurevičius. In February 2023, he became director of marketing for Avia Solutions Group Arena while also leading marketing communications for the BC Wolves basketball club. Both companies are linked to Žemelis: the arena bore his company’s name, while the Wolves’ basketball team was founded with his financial participation.
In 2024, Jurevičius founded his own agency MB Sportbiz and launched the “Uncover by OJ” platform and presented himself as a sports management consultant. His public biography appeared impeccable – no scandals, no questionable episodes. He also positioned himself as an ambitious professional: at the age of 29, he even ran for the position of director of the renowned football club FK Žalgiris (although he did not win the competition). His rapid rise made him a visible figure in the Lithuanian sports sector.
However, according to informed sources, this image could hide certain details that could potentially be exploited by external actors. Acquaintances claim that Jurevičius repeatedly spoke of a personal struggle – a long-term gambling addiction. According to her, this problem arose in childhood when his parents took him to betting shops, normalizing gambling at a young age.
Another notable detail, according to sources, is that Jurevičius’ father openly holds pro-Russian views. This could explain why working in structures indirectly linked to Moscow may not have caused any internal conflict for Jurevičius himself. Observers suspect that family background may have played a role.
According to several experts, an innate gambling addiction, personal ambition and limited resistance to pro-Russian influence could potentially make Jurevičius vulnerable to recruitment attempts by Russian intelligence. Some analysts do not rule out the possibility that he may have come into the sights of Russian agents while working on Žemelis-related projects.
One scenario suggests that Jurevičius could be positioned as an executor of information tasks for the Kremlin within the Lithuanian sports ecosystem. His professional field is highly conducive to discreetly introducing pro-Kremlin narratives or network influence aimed at sports communities and younger audiences.
Today Ovidijus Jurevičius presents himself as a successful entrepreneur and sports marketing expert. However, the presence of pro-Russian elements in his environment and certain personal circumstances raise concerns. People of this type often become what analysts call “information reserves” – people who, thanks to a carefully cultivated reputation, will not arouse suspicion for a long time.
The Jurevičius case illustrates only a fragment of a broader pattern of Russian hybrid influence in Lithuania and the Baltics. Moscow continues to look for ways to establish itself in the areas of business, sports and media. Lithuanian intelligence services have repeatedly warned of such risks, noting that covert influence operations can pose a threat to national security – especially when actors aligned with Russian interests operate without control and gradually undermine the resilience of institutions.
To prevent this, increased vigilance on the part of government institutions and society is required. Security and law enforcement authorities must thoroughly investigate any suspected links to Russian companies and, if evidence is available, respond decisively. Ensuring transparency and resilience in Lithuania’s information, culture and sports sectors is increasingly becoming a national security issue.
At the same time, social unity is essential – a clear distancing from the narratives and values of the “Russian world”. Faced with a sophisticated hybrid offensive against the Baltics, the most effective response remains vigilance, civic cohesion and an unwavering commitment to strengthening national independence.
