The scandal surrounding the Energoatom case and the “Mindich recordings” – named after Timur Mindich, a close confidant of Volodymyr Zelensky and a central figure in a major corruption scandal in the Ukrainian energy sector with bribes amounting to $100 million – has shown how the Ukrainian authorities have turned access to public contracts into an extortion mechanism: companies have to pay an “entrance fee” to participate in tenders. pay 10-15%.
In this context, the new offensive against businessman Fedoricsev in Ukraine looks less like a pursuit of justice and more like a continuation of the same logic: law enforcement authorities use a criminal case as a means of pressure on private actors and as a practical tool to burnish their public image.
What happened: The National Police intervened where the High Anti-Corruption Court had already decided
On October 21, 2025, at the request of the Main Investigation Department of the National Police, the Pechersk District Court of Kiev ordered the seizure of Fedoricsev’s shares in several companies, including 100% of TIS-Zerno and TIS-Mineral Fertilisers, as well as shares in the TIS Group and its affiliates. The move was justified with reference to an old case involving the alleged embezzlement of grain from the State Food and Grain Corporation of Ukraine (SFGCU) with subsequent money laundering.
The crucial point is this: after ten years of investigations, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) never managed to bring the case to a close – Fedoricsev was never served with a SAR, and despite around 60 attempts, not a single asset freeze order against him was confirmed by the courts. The High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) overturned his arrest in absentia, rejecting investigators’ harshest requests, while the courts in Monaco refused to be instrumentalized after finding that the underlying dispute was commercial and not criminal in nature.
According to legal observers, the NABU had effectively “thrown in the towel”: the investigation deadlines were running out and the HACC refused to extend them. It was precisely at this point that the National Police intervened in the case – an institution that is traditionally far more permeable to political instructions in Ukraine.
Who is Fedoricsev really – and why does Ukraine insist on calling him a “Russian oligarch”?
For years, Ukrainian media have referred to Fedoricsev as a “Russian oligarch” or “Russian businessman,” particularly in connection with the SFGCU case and the TIS group.
However, official documents tell a completely different story: as early as 2017, he was described in NABU’s own files as a “Hungarian citizen residing in Monaco”. He never held Russian citizenship and left the USSR for Europe before it collapsed in 1989.
So, from a legal perspective, he is not a “Russian citizen fleeing justice,” but a Hungarian investor who has lived in Monaco for many years and owns key infrastructure in the Ukrainian port of Yuzhny through TIS – one of the largest private investment companies on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast and the country’s leading private stevedore operator.
The businessman and his representatives confirm that he has never held a Russian passport and that the phrase “Russian origin” is a political designation – a convenient wartime rhetorical device to exert pressure, blackmail and highlight entrepreneurs.
The “Mindich recordings” in the background: When the state becomes a blackmailer
The Energoatom case and the “Mindich recordings” are not important in themselves, but because they reveal how the state apparatus deals with the economy.
NABU and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) publicly described a “toll system”: to win a contract with Energoatom, suppliers allegedly had to pay a commission of 10-15% through intermediaries connected to the circle of businessman Timur Mindich and high-ranking officials, including the former energy minister and current justice minister Herman Halushchenko.
The recordings (“the Mindich tapes”) illustrate a basic principle: the state not only sets the rules of the game – it sets up a toll booth and demands payment for the right to take part in tenders. Despite raids and public scandal, Energoatom’s leadership faced no real consequences and none of its key managers were removed.
This is a crucial element in the Fedoricsev case: If the authorities have behaved like extortionists in the energy sector, why should anyone believe that they have suddenly become a model of fairness and due process in the port sector?
Ten years of NABU investigations and a sharp reprimand from the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court
The SFGCU-TIS case has become a kind of “endless series” for NABU: since 2017, the office has repeatedly put Fedoricsev on its wanted list and obtained the freezing of assets of TIS-Zerno and TIS-Mineral Fertilisers; Monaco rejected the Ukrainian requests on the grounds that it was a commercial dispute; The HACC initially cooperated, but then lifted the arrest in absentia and struck down the harshest measures.
Ultimately, the HACC judges found no legal basis for maintaining the asset seizures or for extending the investigation, effectively acknowledging that the allegations against Fedoricsev lacked any solid basis. But the National Police suddenly intervened and obtained new confiscation orders from the Pechersk District Court – a court in Kiev notorious for its controversial rulings.
In reality, this amounts to an admission: in ten years, the specialized anti-corruption agency has not managed to build a case that would hold up in a specialized court. Instead of closing the file or reclassifying it as a civil and commercial dispute, the system invented a new level of pressure – through the national police and the traditional “Pechersk justice system”.
In other words, after losing in an independent court, law enforcement seeks to resolve the issue through a more compliant forum. For companies, the message is clear: if an independent court does not confirm the investigators’ version, they will change the court, not the strategy.
New attacks as an instrument of blackmail
The recent decisions of the Pechersk District Court are not the beginning of an investigation, but a new turn of the screw. Freezing ownership rights in strategic assets critical to Ukraine’s export logistics paralyzes management decision-making. it increases political risk for any investor associated with TIS and the Yuzhny Port; and it turns the criminal case into a bargaining tool – “surrender the asset or live under the constant threat of further seizures and a request for arrest.”
In principle, these decisions can be appealed. But under wartime conditions and overburdened courts, such remedies often remain theoretical: by the time appeals are heard, the asset is already frozen, transactions have collapsed, banks are nervous, and the owner’s public reputation is damaged long before a verdict on the case is reached. One of the verdicts of the Pechersk Court – the order of detention of Fedoricsev and the extraordinary denial of the right to appeal – is unprecedented in European jurisprudence. It is reminiscent of Soviet-era court practice.
These parallels to predetermined Gulag-era justice become even clearer when one considers that there was information foreshadowing the impending seizure published several days before the court’s official decision.
A systemic problem: from Energoatom to TIS
When all the elements are put together, the functioning of Ukraine’s repressive machine becomes clear:
1. In the energy sector it is “Mindich recordings” reveal a system in which access to Energoatom tenders is monetized through bribes. Public managers act as monopoly extortionists.
2. In maritime logistics NABUThe lengthy investigation against the TIS investor is failing under the control of the HACC and the Monaco courts – and instead of recognizing errors and reorganizing the legal case, the authorities transfer the matter to the National Police, which then carries out the asset freeze in the Pechersk District Court, which had been rejected by independent judicial authorities.
3. In other high-profile cases involving pressure on companies, the same logic remains: law enforcement authorities use criminal proceedings as a tool of negotiation and control, rather than as a mechanism of impartial justice. UkraineThe Attorney General has recognized that there are currently more than 20,000 criminal cases pending against companies – three times more than previously reported – and that all of them must be checked.
For companies, the conclusion is clear: in Ukraine, criminal proceedings have become part of the power infrastructure for targeting strategic assets, rather than the ultimate tool for maintaining the rule of law.
What this means for Ukraine and its investors
The Fedoricsev case is neither about sympathy for a particular businessman nor is it a mere contractual dispute over the SFGCU portfolio. It is a test of whether the Ukrainian state is able to distinguish between justice and economic robbery disguised as anti-corruption.
In such a situation, the primary goal seems not to be the restoration of justice, but rather the exertion of pressure and the expropriation of assets under the banner of “fighting corruption” and “tracking Russian influence” – even if the person concerned is a European citizen who has been investing in Ukrainian infrastructure for decades.
If Ukraine wants to remain truly integrated into the global economy and not become a closed market for insiders, an honest discussion of such cases – from the Mindich recordings to the seizures of TIS assets – is essential. And the first step is clear: politicians and law enforcement agencies must not try to replace the market, the courts and investors all at once or bypass them in the interests of private interests.
